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25 July 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, COMIREX

SUBJECT: Rapid Readout and Reporting of Imagery
for Warning and Indications Intelligence
Purposes

REFERENCES: A. Memorandum to Holders of USIB-D-28.1/8,
14 July 69, Special Limited Distribution

B. USIB-D-28.1/8, 26 June 69, Special
Limited Distribution

1. As reported in the above references, the Strategic Warning Working Group (SWWG) in its assessment of [redacted] pinpointed a requirement for a rapid readout of each overhead reconnaissance mission oriented to warning and indications intelligence needs. Also required in company with such a readout is the reporting of the results as soon as possible by electrical messages at high precedence. It is anticipated that these initial readouts by photo interpreters--caveated, if warranted, as to the preliminary nature of the reporting--would be in advance of the preparation of briefing boards and/or other types of more deliberate reporting now practiced. In our view the requested reporting would represent inputs for warning and indications purposes [redacted]

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2. This electrical reporting of initial readouts should be made through present [redacted] channels addressed to the following:

- a. National Indications Center
- b. DIA/ISIC
- c. CIA Operations Center

A suitable message identifier (code word) could be made a part of the address. If this proposed procedure proves to be of value, other addressees such as NSA and State may be added later.

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3. To be effective the type of reporting envisaged would have to be selective and avoid indiscriminate tabulation of mission results against the comprehensive list of COMIREX targets involved in the particular mission being reported upon. Desired here is the dynamic recognition and reporting of new developments and/or changes in posture as well as deviations from previously observed practices in the target countries.

4. These reporting criteria, which are only examples, should be applied to target categories in the USSR and, in a few instances, other nations. They should include:

- a. Nuclear power ballistic missile submarine bases;
- b. Long range aviation heavy bomber home bases;
- c. Naval aviation heavy bomber home bases as well as the Olenagorsk staging base;
- d. Tank and motorized rifle units garrison areas in the East European Communist nations as well as in such Soviet military districts as Baltic, Carpathian, Odessa, North Caucasus, Transcaucasus, Turkestan and Far East;
- e. Transloading yards including: Chop, Kaliningrad, Rava Russkaya, Chernyakhovsk, Brest Tsentralnyy and the Chinese Communist yards of Manchouli and Erlien on the Soviet border as well as the Pinghsiang yard adjacent to North Vietnam;
- f. Representative port areas as follows: Haiphong in North Vietnam; and in the USSR, Nikolayev on the Black Sea and Vladivostok in the Far East;
- g. Airborne transport bases including the following: Vitebsk NE, Pskov, Kirovabad, Fergana, Tartu, and Zavitinsk NE.

5. In accordance with your suggestions, a review will be made of recent [redacted] an attempt to identify practical examples of items which meet indications/warning criteria and would benefit from accelerated and selective dissemination. The result of this review will be forwarded to you and your evaluation would be appreciated. It is anticipated that mutually beneficial adjustments in criteria, target areas and alerting procedures can be accomplished after some experience with the requested reporting. These target areas have been postulated in accordance with present overhead reconnaissance capabilities and are not the same as those which might be recommended for systems with improved frequency of coverage and reporting capability.

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cc: DDCI

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Chairman
Strategic Warning Working Group

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